Questions of distribution of shared responsibility continue to challenge international courts and other decision-makers. Examples of such questions that are discussed in the present volume are distribution of responsibility in relation to harm caused to civilians in armed conflicts; 1 climate change; 2 prosecution of pirates; 3 failure to protect social and economic rights; 4 and the global financial crisis. 5 In all these situations, the question arises who is responsible and how responsibility is to be distributed between multiple actors.
The question of distribution of responsibility is key to the understanding and application of shared responsibility in international law. In this volume, we speak of 'shared responsibility' as a matter of international law when a multiplicity of actors contributes to a single harmful outcome, and legal responsibility for this harmful outcome is distributed separately among more than one of the contributing actors. 6 If shared responsibility indeed implies a distribution of responsibility between multiple actors, it inevitably raises the question of the grounds on which such responsibility is to be distributed.
The term 'distribution', on a basic level, refers to the 'allocation' or 'division' of something between multiple persons or entities. In this volume, 'distribution' is meant to cover more than merely the implementation of the responsibility regime. It addresses the normative foundations for the actual choices that are made in terms of thinking of the allocation of responsibility among several wrongdoing entities.
While the term 'distribution' thus is relatively straightforward, the notion 'distribution of responsibility' has two separate, though interrelated, meanings deriving from the dual meaning of the term 'responsibility'.
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In the first meaning of 'responsibility', 'distribution of responsibilities' is concerned with how multiple actors determine ex ante who should do what in relation to a common purpose or a common interest. For instance, the question can be posed as to which states and international institutions must act in situations of mass atrocities 8 or in relation to the protection of social and economic rights. 9 In both examples, it is clear that while some obligations under international law (e.g., the obligation to cooperate) can rest similarly on all states and international institutions, when it comes to specific obligations (e.g., which states are obliged to take forceful measures to protect civilians), a division of tasks is necessary. In this use of the term, 'responsibility' is essentially shorthand for 'duty' or 'obligation' -terms that might or might not be used in a strictly legal meaning. 10 Such duties or obligations then need to be distributed.
In the second meaning of 'responsibility', the expression 'distribution of responsibilities' seeks to answer the question of how responsibility is divided ex post between multiple actors who have contributed to a particular harm. This question is, for instance, raised in relation to harmful conduct in peacekeeping operations 11 and climate change.
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In this meaning, the term 'distribution of responsibility' thus relates to responsibility for wrongful conduct and harmful outcomes.
In this volume, we are primarily concerned with the second meaning. The difficulty of allocating responsibility between multiple parties for wrongdoing has been puzzling courts and scholars alike, and it is this difficulty that has informed the research project from which this volume emanates. 13 However, we recognise that there is an intimate connection between the two meanings -an issue to which we will return in section 5 of this chapter.
In cases where multiple states contribute to a harmful outcome, and the test of causation does not provide an answer to the question of who is responsible for what, several possibilities arise. One option is that no state is held responsible. Another suggestion is that one state is responsible for the whole damage, no matter how large its individual contribution. A third possibility is that all states involved are responsible, but only for the part that is attributed to them. A fourth option is that all states are jointly and severally responsible, and they all are responsible for the full damage, irrespective of their own specific contributions. A fifth and final option is that states rely on some other criterion (e.g., fairness) to distribute responsibility.
The choice between these options is of critical importance for all actors involved, and often for the larger international community. It determines who is to act to ensure that reparation is provided and that community values are protected.
However, international law has had very little to say on the question of when and on what grounds decisions are to be made, one way or the other. The first edited volume in this series, Principles of Shared Responsibility in International Law: An Appraisal of the State of the Art, 15 reviewed the extent to which the current law of responsibility, as laid down by the International Law Commission (ILC), is or could be relevant in solving questions of shared responsibility, including the question of distribution. The book noted that although the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) 16 and the Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO) 17 were not designed and drafted with situations of shared responsibility in mind, the Articles did not necessarily preclude determinations of shared responsibility. The Articles are quite flexible and to some extent can be adapted to new situations. In fact, one can identify examples in the case law of various international courts and tribunals that applied such principles in a shared responsibility context. 18 However, the Articles provide only limited guidance for the distribution of responsibility. As a whole, the chapters in that first volume led to the conclusion that if international law is to be helpful in addressing questions of shared responsibility, it will often be necessary to look beyond the ILC legacy.
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This lack of guidance that international law currently provides for questions of distribution presents both practical and theoretical problems. On a practical level, this means that it is difficult for courts and tribunals to make satisfactory assessments of the forms and amounts of reparation to be provided by one actor, in a situation where multiple actors contributed to the harm. A good illustration is the Bosnian Genocide case. 20 The International Court of Justice (ICJ or Court) first found that the fact that the obligation to prevent genocide rests upon a multitude of states does not reduce the obligations of each individual state. When considering whether the obligations of Serbia to prevent genocide would be affected by the action or inaction of other states, the Court held that it is irrelevant whether the State whose responsibility is in issue claims, or even proves, that even if it had employed all means reasonably at its disposal, they would not have sufficed to prevent the commission of genocide. As well as being generally difficult to prove, this is irrelevant to the breach of the obligation of conduct in question, the more so since the possibility remains that the combined efforts of several States, each complying with its obligation to prevent, might have achieved the resultaverting the commission of genocide -which the efforts of only one State were insufficient to produce. 21 Yet, in considering compensation, the Court found that it had not been shown that in the specific circumstances of the case, the use of the means of influence by Serbia and Montenegro 'would have sufficed to achieve the result which the Respondent should have sought'. 22 The Court declined to order Serbia and Montenegro to pay compensation. 23 This contrast between the acceptance of Serbia's obligations irrespective of the role of other states, on the one hand, and the inability to allocate the obligation to reparation to Serbia precisely because other actors were involved, on the other, is unsatisfactory. 24 At a practical level, that holds first and foremost for victims (in this case Bosnia), which then may be unable to obtain reparation.
On a theoretical level, the question of distribution requires some normative basis that needs to ground the legal framework. This normative introduction: mapping the normative framework 5 basis has so far not been the object of a systematic study. Often, in the literature, the normative underpinnings are implied in the legal framework that is advocated, rather than being expressly articulated and justified, in particular in advocating particular primary obligations in relation to, for instance, genocide or climate change. The absence of express and fundamental articulations of a specific normative justification may in part be caused by the fact that such articulations would entail paradigms, concepts, and methodologies that are far removed from legal doctrine. However, the normative basis for the attribution and distribution of responsibility generally, and shared responsibility in particular, has direct consequences on the mechanisms that are put in place and how they operate. A choice for one ground of distribution over the other, based on one's own moral and conceptual approach to responsibility and distribution, has immediate wider implications. For instance, a focus on the public order dimension of the legal framework might lead to ascribing obligations to provide reparation to different entities than in case one would emphasise the private interests at stake. In the former case, there may be an interest to assign obligations of cessation or reparation to all actors whose acts undermine particular public goods or values. In the latter case, it may be sufficient if one actor provides reparation, as long as the injured parties are thereby satisfied.
Another example of how competing normative or conceptual perspectives may lead to different appraisals in terms of distribution is a situation of genocide. The nature of genocide might call for rules of distribution of responsibility that strictly focus on the particular role of a particular state, and exclude joint and several liability, given the moral stigma of a finding in that direction. However, one might to the contrary argue for looser rules of distribution, with less focus on causation and more on ensuring adequate reparation of the harm, given the need to avoid impunity for such an act. 25 So far, models of international and shared responsibility rarely provide a theoretical foundation for understanding the differences between these approaches, let alone explain the choices made between them. This in turn will impact the way judges or other decision-makers will approach the question of distribution.
The present volume responds to the practical and conceptual problems identified here. We explore articulations of the grounds on which actors, participating in a collective endeavour, can be blamed for their respective contribution to a harmful outcome. Given the fact that international law often gives no clear direction for distribution in such cases, the volume inquires into the bases and justifications for apportionment of responsibilities that could support a critique of current international law, support choices in the application of the law, and could provide a basis for reform.
The volume offers a diversity of approaches. Indeed, the underlying idea is not to trace a path to a particular normative framework, but rather to map the landscape of possible normative frameworks that might apply to the distribution of responsibilities under international law.
There is not one approach that has been adopted in the various chapters. Rather, the volume brings together possible approaches that might in certain circumstances, but not necessarily, complement each other. All chapters agree on the basic intellectual premise that underlies the whole project: there is a need for the development of a comprehensive legal framework on shared responsibility, solidly argued on a normative basis, and grounded in the changing realities of the international legal order. 26 However, there are fundamental differences in the normative choices and methodologies of the chapters. Ultimately, policy choices have to be made, in light of the social, political, moral, and legal preferences of decision-makers. Against this background, the importance of this volume is that by shedding light on these policy considerations, it helps to make an informed choice.
In this sense, this book has both a modest and an ambitious objective. Modest, because it does not purport to intellectually and normatively defend a single approach to the distribution of shared responsibility. 27 Ambitious, because it aims at providing comprehensive tools for a better understanding of the concept of shared responsibility and the ensuing theoretical underpinnings in relation to the distribution of such responsibility among wrongdoers.
The various approaches to distribution in this volume are far from abstract and conceptual musings. Normative choices for distribution can have a concrete impact on the legal frameworks that are set up to address current challenges of international law. This is illustrated in introduction: mapping the normative frameworkmany chapters in this volume, which are contextualised in relation to particular topical areas of international law, such as piracy, climate change, or the duties of the international community to protect and safeguard human rights. All in all, this book aims to contribute to the discussion on responsibility in three dimensions: a conceptual/theoretical dimension of explaining the possible normative foundations for the distribution of responsibility; a practical dimension of setting the conceptual discussion in the context of particular areas of international law; and, ultimately, a policy dimension in providing an informed starting point for possible development of the law.
Taking account of the need for differentiation and context specificity, we will explain in this introductory chapter our methodology in mapping different approaches (section 2); identify the components of the map: that is, fundamental concepts, choices, and approaches that have an impact on questions of distribution of responsibility (section 3); identify possible grounds for distribution as these are discussed in the contributions to the volume (section 4); and discuss what all of this may mean for the construction and development of international law on responsibility (section 5). The chapter closes with a brief roadmap of the volume (section 6).
Mapping conceptual approaches
As noted earlier, this volume does not aim at providing the grounding for a single normative or conceptual approach to the distribution of shared responsibilities in international law, but rather to map a range of possible bases for the distribution of responsibility.
In order to map possible conceptual understandings of the distribution of responsibility, the choice was made to cover a number of approaches that provide some insight into how to address such distribution. These can be divided into four categories: an economic analysis of law; a moral philosophy approach to responsibility; a political approach; and what can be called a pragmatic normative approach. It should be noted that there are differences and disagreements within these approaches. An illustration in this volume is whether collective entities can be moral agents, an issue that divides moral philosophers. 28 Equally, one can note differences between the various chapters relying on an economic analysis of law. However, it was not possible to account for all the subtleties in the various disciplinary fields considered. This volume provides the first reasonably comprehensive normative map of the ways to approach the distribution of responsibility. Future scholarly work can build on it and seek further refinement of the various approaches. The economic analysis of law provides tools for understanding the efficient distribution of responsibility in light of economic models such as the 'tragedy of the commons' and the 'prisoners' dilemma'. It allows a better assessment of the different ways in which responsibility can be distributed, depending on both the type of responsibility that is envisioned (individual, joint, and several) and the type of reparation that is sought (individualised, collective). This approach allows Van Aaken, for example, to explain that particular types of responsibility are more likely to be conducive to international cooperation, 29 or Kontorovich to explain why privatisation of the fight against piracy might be more efficient.
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In another application of the economic analysis of law, Trachtman argues that a choice for either rules for the allocation of responsibility ex ante or for general principles for the allocation of responsibility ex post, affect 'net benefits of internalisation of policy externalities' in different manners.
31
The moral philosophy approach focuses more on a moral evaluation of the conduct and the blameworthiness of the entities that engage in that conduct. The distribution of responsibility then flows from this evaluation. The decision to allocate responsibility comes as a consequence of the determination of such blameworthiness (or 'moral guilt'). This approach can therefore be called deontological in nature, and moves away from the more consequentialist focus of the economic analysis of law approach, which tends to concentrate more on the allocation of liability and reparations, and less on the actual blame of the wrongdoer. In other words, the deontological approach is more likely to provide answers for the distribution of blame, while the economic analysis of law approach is more likely to provide answers for the efficient allocation of financial obligations. This moral approach allows Kutz, introduction: mapping the normative frameworkof climate change, to discuss the ways in which to distribute the burden of the reduction of carbon emissions, based on the past conduct of states.
32
The political approach sets the legal analysis of distribution in the broader discussion of political incentives for action. This approach is important in two respects. First, it recognises that most areas of international law do not exist in a political void. Issues such as climate change or the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) are debated in the context of strong political oppositions and narratives, which cannot be ignored when discussing the possible evolution of the legal regimes to implement them. Second, and more conceptually, it stems from the acknowledgement that law operates within the confines of a certain political community, and legal responsibility ultimately constitutes the basis for a broader political responsibility. 33 Lang observes that 'instead of solely tying individual agents to specific actions, this initial act of locating responsibility in specific agents can be used to compel agents to engage in forms of political action that construct new political arrangements, rather than ending in punitive or even restorative consequences'.
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The fourth approach is that of normative pragmatism. What underlies this approach is the acceptance of the fragmented reality of the international legal order, and the suggestion that broad normative agendas can be attained in that context. The idea is that there is not necessarily a need to comprehensively rethink the legal framework in a unitary way to achieve a certain goal, but that this goal can be achieved, at least in large part, through a collection of existing legal tools. Hakimi illustrates this approach in relation to R2P, showing that a number of mechanisms already exist to ensure that some aspects of it can become a reality. 35 In the same way, Salomon explores legal tools available in order to guarantee the protection and development of socio-economic rights.
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This approach is, to some extent, complementary to the previous three approaches in the sense that the goal to be achieved can be identified through the economic, moral, and political evaluations already discussed. The difference of this approach is that it focuses on the connections between the normative agenda and the existing legal framework. For 32 Kutz, 'Shared Responsibility for Climate Change: From Guilt to Taxes', n. 2, at 341-342. 33 A.F. Lang, Jr., 'Shared Political Responsibility', Chapter 3 in this volume, 62. 34 Ibid., at 65. 35 Hakimi, 'Distributing the Responsibility to Protect', n. 1. 36 Salomon, 'How to Keep Promises: Making Sense of the Duty Among Multiple States to Fulfil Socio-Economic Rights in the World', n. 4.
instance, Dannenbaum explains that he does not 'articulate and defend a moral account from the ground up, untethered to extant law', but instead aims to build on 'the existing normative substructure of some of the better-elaborated areas of state responsibility under international law '. 37 This has the advantage of grounding the legal discussions in preestablished rules, but also has the possible disadvantage of being affected by any limitations of these rules.
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These four approaches, while possibly leading to different results, are not necessarily incompatible and could even be complementary. Indeed, it is for example perfectly possible to conceive of a normative framework that focuses on victims from a deontological/moral perspective, but then resorts to an economic analysis of law in order to determine the most efficient model for claiming reparations. In the same way, a focus on the moral blame of the perpetrators does not necessarily exclude a resort to economic models or political strategies to identify the distribution of responsibility in order to ensure compliance. It all depends at what stage of the reasoning the different normative frameworks are introduced. In other words, it is not an 'either/or' situation, where policymakers would need to adopt a moral philosophy approach, for example, rather than one based on an economic analysis of the law.
This diversity and possible combination of normative preferences is made possible by two interlinked considerations. First, each model, taken in isolation, might not provide concrete solutions for every scenario. For example, the political context of responsibility will not directly help to determine the concrete moral preferences of the political community in question, and nor will a consequentialist/economic analysis of responsibility remove the need to discuss the prioritisation of acceptable consequences within a given social context. Second, this diversity is an unavoidable consequence of the complex and fragmented reality of possible societal objectives of responsibility. Indeed, reflections on responsibility cannot be made in isolation from social realities and existing preferences, which must be accommodated in the discussions. This is of course true in many areas of law. For example, criminal law is generally a combination of deontological considerations (with a focus on intention and blame) and consequentialist aspects (merely thinking 37 introduction: mapping the normative frameworkof committing a crime will not carry any criminal responsibility in the absence of any preparatory acts). In international law, comparable combinations often will apply. With these methodological clarifications in mind, it rapidly emerges that there are a number of cross-cutting themes that inform questions of distribution, and that in varying degrees will be relevant to each of the four methodological approaches.
Gathering the tools for exploring the map
The chapters, taken as a whole, point to a number of fundamental preliminary questions and choices that influence the distribution of responsibility. Based on existing literature and the contributions to this volume, we identify three such questions, which concern: the structure of collective action (3.1); the objectives of international responsibility (3.2); and the nature of international responsibility (3.3).
The structure of collective action
How responsibility is distributed between multiple actors depends in large part on how one conceives the nature and structure of collective action. The notion of 'collective action' is key to shared responsibility; after all, we have defined shared responsibility as a responsibility that is not incurred by the collective, but is distributed among individual 'members' of the collective. 39 If the responsibility were to rest on a collectivity, it would no longer be shared, but instead be a responsibility of the collectivity as such. 40 Within the category of shared responsibility, therefore, questions will arise concerning the nature of the relationship between the actors within the collective, and how that affects distribution of responsibility between them.
In situations of collective action, a key question is what type of individual contribution to the eventual harm can serve as a basis for allocation of responsibility. It can be argued that the mere membership of 39 Nollkaemper and Jacobs, 'Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Conceptual Framework', n. 7, at 368. See also L. May, Sharing Responsibility (University of Chicago Press, 1996). 40 May, ibid., 116. A major reason why in the present state of international relations exclusive collective responsibility in cases of cooperative action is not an attractive option is that the organisational structures remain too weak and the power of states too strong.
a collective may be sufficient to trigger distribution of responsibility to all. Lang recalls how Hannah Arendt argued 'that simply by living in the current world, one in which we are automatically bound up in a community, we can never avoid responsibility for the actions of our states'. 41 However, all contributors to this volume seem to reject this extreme approach, and seek to identify particular structures and relations in collective action that may serve to identify some, but not all, actors as subjects of responsibility.
The relationship between members of a collective can be construed in different ways. One approach is to disaggregate the collectivity in individual 'members', and to see shared responsibility simply as the aggregation of two or more individual responsibilities. Several authors in this volume adopt this perspective. For instance, Hakimi argues that 'R2P should not posit an all-encompassing duty that falls, at once, on the entire international community. It should instead posit a bundle of more discrete duties, and responsibility for each of these duties should attach to specific outside states at a time'. 42 Pierik notes that the obvious starting point for questions of distribution is an analysis of personal responsibility: 'the conditions under which an individual human being is held responsible for the outcome of a specific choice, behaviour, or act'. 43 Given that collectivities, short of firmly established institutions, are not moral agents, 44 it follows that responsibility is to be distributed to individual components of collectivities.
Placing the emphasis on individual agents is justified by two considerations. One is that it counters the problem of unattributed obligations, which are likely to remain ineffective precisely because it is not clear who needs to perform an obligation. 45 For Hakimi, the important point is that duties for the benefit of foreign populations 'are legally operative . . . only when responsibility can be pinned on particular states at a time'. 46 Erskine observes that 'mistakenly assuming that moral responsibilities can be borne by . . . bodies that do not qualify [as moral agents in world politics] . . . has detrimental consequences. Such missteps hamper attempts to consider, coordinate, and execute remedial action effectively and robustly'. 47 The second justification for focusing on individual actors is based on a moral perspective. It follows the idea that responsibility can only be attributed to agents that can be capable of moral agency and be blamed for their action. Moreover, this is premised on the idea that moral agents can only be responsible for their own specific acts and omissions, not those of someone else. 48 This disaggregation of responsibility to individual actors is particularly important in situations where there is no concerted action, but rather what we call cumulative responsibility.
49 In such cases, we recognise the need for the injured party to be able to claim against several entities. More particularly, in those instances, in the absence of any link between the actions of these entities, there is no need to delve deeper into the nature of the collective action that led to the damage. Examples are cumulative pollution caused by two or more riparian states of an international watercourse, or climate change caused by emissions from several states.
However, shared responsibility cannot always simply be seen as the aggregation of two or more individual responsibilities. Indeed, a defining feature of many situations where issues of shared responsibility arise is that two or more actors stand in some relationship to each other, and the conduct or omission of one influences the conduct or omission of the other(s). 50 This will especially be the case in situations of concerted action. We refer to such instances as cooperative responsibility.
51 This covers examples such as coalition warfare, joint patrols to protect borders against immigration, or responsibility that may result from one state aiding another state in committing a wrongful act.
Whereas in the first situation responsibility can more easily be traced to individually operating states, with their conduct being able to be assessed in isolation, in the second situation the structure of the collective action can, and arguably should, influence the distribution of responsibility. 47 Erskine, '"Coalitions of the Willing" and the Shared Responsibility to Protect', n. 28, at 230. 48 Ibid., at 229-234; Pierik, 'Shared Responsibility in International Law: A NormativePhilosophical Analysis', n. 43, at 39-42. 49 Nollkaemper and Jacobs, 'Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Conceptual Framework', n. 7, at 368-369. 50 May, Sharing Responsibility, n. 39, at 36-38. 51 Nollkaemper and Jacobs, 'Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Conceptual Framework', n. 7, at 368-369.
As Pettit argues, the agency of a collective is actually more than the sum of its members' agency. 52 The collective and the mutual relations within it affect the position of its members. In such cases, disaggregating collective action into individual responsibility is not satisfactory if it ignores the relationship between the various agents.
This volume takes this discussion one step further. A number of chapters provide valuable insights into the structure of collective action and decision-making that is fundamental for assessing the distribution of responsibility of various entities. For instance, Miller presents a relational account of collective moral responsibility as joint responsibility. 53 In his terms, two or more individuals perform a joint action 'if each of them intentionally performs an individual action (or omission), but does so with the (true) belief that in so doing they will jointly realise an end which each of them has'. 54 While collective responsibility is ascribed to individual human beings for their contributory action, 'each is individually responsible for that outcome, jointly with the others'.
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A comparable point is made by Erskine, who, when analysing 'coalitions of the willing', considers that while the coalition cannot be a moral agent as such, it is important to take into account the relationship between its members in order to determine the scope of individual responsibilities. 56 As a result, she considers that when agents come together to form an ad hoc group, 'the enhanced capacities with which individual agents can be imbued as part of an informal association (existing or potential) lead to magnified individual responsibilities'.
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Thus the structure of the collective directly influences the possibilities and types of distribution between the members of the collective.
However, it may be helpful to differentiate between various forms that the relationship between members of a collective can take. As the international legal order becomes increasingly structured by international 52 P. Pettit, 'Responsibility Incorporated' (2007) 56 Erskine, '"Coalitions of the Willing" and the Shared Responsibility to Protect', n. 28, at 250-253. 57 Ibid., at 256 (emphasis in original).
introduction: mapping the normative frameworkorganisations and collective decisions, it is important that conceptual tools be devised to appreciate the corresponding increasingly complex nature of collective endeavours at that level. As explored in this volume, these can vary on a scale from ad hoc ventures to more institutionalised situations. In relation to the first type, Dannenbaum focuses on structures ('joint public enterprises') that are larger than individual states, yet fall short of a collectivity that can be the subject of collective responsibility. 58 For more institutionalised action, Miller emphasises the importance of predetermined rules and mechanisms. 59 While each of these perspectives differs in terms of the weight they attach to the structure of the collective, and the assessment of the implications for distribution of responsibility, they have in common that the unit of analysis in determinations of responsibility in such cases is not just the individual members of the group, but the relations between members. This provides a critical background that points out the significance and complexity of distribution in situations of concerted action.
The objectives of international responsibility
The objectives of responsibility constitute a second tool to explore the map. The basic idea here is that the objectives that one assigns to, or expects from, a system of responsibility will have implications for the choice, and evaluation, of a particular model of distribution. The question of distribution when seen from the perspective of a victim looks different than when seen from the perspective of a perpetrator, or from the interest of cooperation.
A first major division can be drawn between a deontological approach (responsibility based on a duty and the moral blame of the perpetrator) and a consequentialist approach (responsibility based on the assessment of possible outcomes of the violation of the duty).
The deontological approach focuses on the moral agency of the individual agents. As noted by Pierik, this approach 'situates individual responsibility in personal agency and argues that responsibility can only be attributed to agents. Agency refers to the capacity to act deliberately and intentionally'. This approach entails several methodological steps that are relevant to distribution of responsibility. First, as discussed previously, it is necessary to identify relevant agents that might be the bearers of duties. Second, once moral agents have been identified, it is still necessary to identify criteria for the distribution of responsibility between several entities that might be responsible for the harm. 61 The deontological approach impacts on the question of distribution of responsibility in a number of ways. In particular, it is an invitation to consider the retributive dimension of responsibility in relation to particular wrongdoers. However, one can wonder whether international law is well equipped for this, given the traditional absence of fault in discussions on the secondary rules of international law. 62 While it would seem that the 'objective responsibility' approach in international law today, which focuses on the existence of a breach of an international legal obligation per se, is compatible with the deontological approach, the irrelevance of fault (in the absence of specific rules to that effect in particular treaties) in the determination of international responsibility could be seen to be at odds with this approach.
Another impact is that a deontological approach leaves open the possibility that no one entity or state is to be blamed for a particular harm. This is seen by some as a major drawback 63 and justifies taking a consequentialist approach, whereby the existence of a harm to be repaired is the starting point, rather than the identification of a morally culpable agent.
Adoption of a consequentialist approach leads to an altogether different set of consequences in terms of distribution. The contributions to this volume identify three main goals that can be construed in consequentialist terms. 64 Each of these, and also the choice between them, has distinct consequences for distribution.
A first objective is to compensate the injured parties. This aim is backward looking, in the sense that it focuses on harm that has already 61 These possible criteria are discussed in more detail in section 4. 62 introduction: mapping the normative frameworkoccurred. In terms of distribution, two points can be noted. On the one hand, a responsibility regime that aims to secure this function in effects shifts, as Kornhauser notes, the harm 'from the "victim" to one or more legally responsible agents'. 65 On the other hand, for instance, from a victim's perspective, joint and several responsibility may be most favourable, since a victim 'just needs to identify one violator and can pick the one which, first, can be brought before a court, and second, has deep pockets'.
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A second aim is to deter states from engaging in harmful actions in the future. 67 This aim is forward looking. If international law is to contribute to this aim, it has to create proper incentives for states. 68 This aim, too, has distinct implications for distribution. For instance, it could be argued that, from this angle, responsibility should be allocated to those actors that matter in terms of power, control, and capacity.
69 Distribution schemes that leave some actors that contribute to harm unaddressed may not be efficient, as these actors may otherwise not have an incentive to take proper care.
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A third aim is to secure international cooperation. This is not commonly seen as an independent objective of responsibility, and never seems to have been an aim for the ILC. However, as Van Aaken notes, different forms of responsibility are 'a crucial variable for understanding why cooperation arises (or not), since it impacts upon the propensity to cooperate in the first place'. 71 For instance, a distribution of responsibility based on independent responsibility 'would inhibit the propensity of cooperation in the first place, since the pay-off of cooperation would be potentially diminished to a great extent'.
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The relationship between objectives of responsibility, on the one hand, and distribution of responsibility, on the other, is made more complex since actors may pursue multiple aims that may conflict with each other. For instance, Kornhauser observes the tension between the social aims of deterrence and compensation: 'The deterrence objective requires that 65 Kornhauser, ibid., at 121. 66 Van Aaken, 'Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Political Economy Analysis', n. 14, at 186. 67 Kornhauser, 'Incentives, Compensation, and Irreparable Harm', n. 64, at 121-122. 68 Ibid. 69 See section 4.4 entitled 'The role of power'. 70 Kornhauser, 'Incentives, Compensation, and Irreparable Harm', n. 64, at 130-132. 71 Van Aaken, 'Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Political Economy Analysis', n. 14, at 154. 72 Ibid., at 186. the agent be able to avoid financial responsibility by taking socially desirable actions but, when the agent escapes financial liability, that liability must fall on the victim or be socialised through an insurance scheme.' 73 The way such potential tensions are mitigated or resolved has direct implications for distribution of responsibility.
The nature of international responsibility
A third exploration tool of the map is the nature of international responsibility. This is obviously closely linked to the question of the objectives of responsibility, as previously discussed. However, the question of the nature of international responsibility is situated on a meta-level and requires us to reflect on the role of responsibility in relation to the nature of the international legal order.
On this point, the distinction that we drew in previous work between its public order dimension and private dimension is of key relevance to questions of distribution. 74 The private dimension of international responsibility is exemplified in the bilateral structure of many obligations, as well as the bilateral structure of international dispute settlement, which focuses primarily on the interaction between the alleged wrongdoing state and the injured state. 75 However, certain dimensions of international law, such as the development of peremptory norms or the preference for objective responsibility in the ARSIWA, point to a more public dimension. Emphasising one dimension of responsibility over another may have direct implications for questions of distribution.
However, we also argued that it would be too simple to frame international responsibility in either a public or a private, or even in one single sui generis paradigm. The unitary approach to international responsibility cannot capture the various aspects of what it means to invoke the responsibility of multiple agents for particular harms, and we proposed a more differentiated approach to shared responsibility. 76 In this volume, most chapters bring to the fore the public dimension of international responsibility. For example, Dannenbaum focuses on public enterprises; Erskine focuses on coalitions of the willing; and Shue and Kutz on climate change. They highlight, in relation to areas that are 73 Kornhauser, 'Incentives, Compensation, and Irreparable Harm', n. 64, at 127. 74 Nollkaemper and Jacobs, 'Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Conceptual Framework', n. 7, at 398-407. 75 Ibid., at 432. 76 Ibid., at 415.
generally deemed to be public goods (e.g., prevention of mass atrocities, human rights, and climate change), the need to better accommodate the legal framework with the nature of international obligations. For example, climate change responsibility requires more than a traditional tort-like evaluation of causation, but brings in global historical and moral evaluations. 77 This also shows the limits of traditional models of responsibility, such as the idea of transboundary harm.
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This emphasis on the public order dimension of international obligations has implications for distribution of responsibility, should harm occur. It calls attention to the relevant agents who would be responsible for ensuring respect for community values at the international level. This public dimension of certain duties in relation to, for example, the prevention of mass atrocities or the protection of common goods has an uneasy relationship to the absence of a centralised international authority tasked with ensuring their respect. In that regard, the current framework of both particular sets of primary obligations (e.g., the obligation to prevent genocide or the obligation to protect social, economic, and cultural rights) and of international responsibility provides inadequate answers to the question of the exact bearers of collective duties. 79 This significantly complicates the question of distribution of responsibility.
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In addition to the suggestion that the United Nations might play this role, 81 various chapters propose solutions. In that respect, the varying nature of obligations, and of related responsibility, is reflected in different proposals: efficient cooperation (Kontorovich); 82 pragmatism (Hakimi 77 Kutz, 'Shared Responsibility for Climate Change: From Guilt to Taxes', n. 2, at 342. 78 and Salomon); 83 political cooperation (Cole); 84 or heightened rules of conduct and responsibility (Erskine, Dannenbaum, and to a certain extent, Kutz). 85 All these solutions accept the current structure of the international legal order and suggest ways to address collective aims within it.
The authors can be placed on a sliding scale of adaptation to the public order dimension of international responsibility. At one end of the scale is the breaking down of the common value into somewhat more manageable obligations that can rest on easily identifiable agents. This is the approach adopted by Hakimi and Salomon in relation to R2P and social and economic rights. 86 At the other end of the scale is the idea that certain obligations should rest on a broader category of agents. For example, Miller suggests various levels, both domestic and international, on which regulatory obligations could reside in relation to the financial crisis. 87 Along the same lines, Erskine argues that ultimately all states might have some duty to coalesce to achieve certain outcomes, even if they do not succeed. 88 
Criteria for distribution
In a study on distribution of responsibility, the key question is on the basis of what criteria is distribution eventually to be grounded. We have already indicated several grounds, in as much as these were related to the objectives attributed to responsibility or the construction of the nature of responsibility. It is nonetheless useful to expressly identify, briefly, the most important grounds because these, from various methodological angles, will be discussed in this volume.
We emphasise that the contents and nature of such grounds for distribution will be highly context-specific. Grounds that may be relevant in one context may be much less helpful in a different setting. For example, it may be useful to distinguish between causal responsibility, legal responsibility, and financial responsibility for harm. 89 Which of those forms of responsibility matters, and is actually to be distributed, will depend on the context. It also may be useful to distinguish between types of harm that arise in particular issue-areas. Questions of distribution present themselves in quite different forms in situations of divisible harm compared to situations of indivisible harm. In cases of indivisible harm, the question is whether responsibility can really be divided among several tortfeasors. A further distinction can be made between reparable and irreparable harm. For instance, in cases of irreparable harm, the cost for victims cannot be transferred to other actors. 90 In the subsections that follow, we will move on from such issuespecific factors and identify a number of general grounds that may be relevant for distribution of responsibility and that will be explored in this volume: obligations (4.1); causation (4.2); contributions (4.3); power (4.4); and fairness (4.5).
Obligations
The distribution of responsibility largely depends on the contents of primary obligations. Not all contributions made by members of a collective are legally equally relevant; it all depends on what contributions are proscribed by international law. For example, the question of distribution of responsibility in relation to climate change relies strongly on the question of what international law actually does, or does not, proscribe.
An important example of such obligations and their relevance to questions of distribution, identified in several chapters, are obligations to prevent a particular harm. Obligations to prevent, for instance, exist in relation to mass atrocities. In such cases, the contents and nature of such an obligation may be relevant for identifying which states are obliged to prevent, and possibly also for the distribution of responsibility between in order to achieve a distribution of responsibility, but also rests on moral grounds. As noted by Pierik, 'we can only reasonably be held responsible for the outcome(s) of our actions and decisions'. 97 However, causation is not the tool that will fix all questions of distribution. For one thing, the contents of the standard of causation remain unsettled. 98 Courts that opt for one particular approach to causation are invariably subject to critique for choosing that over another method. The approach of the ICJ to causation in the Bosnian Genocide case is an example. 99 Moreover, standards of causation are hardly neutral. Establishing causation is not a purely factual operation. There is a clear normative choice involved in selecting those causes which might entail legal responsibility. This is precisely why, as explained by Kornhauser, the distinction between causal responsibility and legal responsibility is critical. 100 Causal responsibility does not necessarily entail legal responsibility. 101 There is a more practical limitation to relying on causation as an easy fix to questions of distribution. In many cases, there will be a problem of over-determination. 102 Specifically in the context of collective action, causation may be of limited use, since collective action might create problems in determining the causal link between conduct and consequences of the conduct. This in turn may lead to dilution of responsibility. This is especially true if structural causes are taken into account. Salomon observes that '[i]f we take the case of biofuels: global food prices would not have skyrocketed but for the European Union and United States (US) policies on production.' 103 Likewise, Lang notes that while at one level one can think of corporations as subjects of liability for global harms, such as climate change, states that create corporations without proper regulation should also be considered as being responsible.
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Several conditions can thus be identified that are relevant, yet are in themselves insufficient to generate an outcome. Choices thus have to be made on the basis of other criteria. Pierik observes in this context that it will be necessary to 'limit our analysis to those links in the causal chain of events that can be linked to actions and/or decisions that are relevant in any moral or legal sense'.
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There are two possible solutions to the difficulty of solving questions of distribution through causation. The first one is to remove any discussion of individual causation altogether, for instance through the application of a version of joint responsibility.
106 If the collective action has led to the damage, then each individual entity becomes individually responsible for the full outcome, irrespective of his or her actual contribution to the harm. The second one is a middle ground whereby the principle of responsibility would be determined by participation in the collective endeavour, while the quantum of responsibility would be conditional on the actual conduct of the entity. For example, in a North Atlantic Treaty Organization operation decided by the organisation, every state is in principle responsible for the conduct of the organisation, but a state that merely voted for the military action might face less responsibility than a state that actually conducted the operations on the ground. This latter solution, while in theory providing a more subtle approach to the distribution of responsibilities within organisational structures, will raise some practical difficulties.
Contributions
A third category of factors relevant to distribution of responsibility concerns the nature of contributions to a harmful outcome. This is obviously directly related to causation, but the focus here is more on the nature of contributions to harm. Various chapters point to this criterion as a key element in allocating responsibility. For instance, Shue points to current emissions per capita of the residents of states as a criterion for distributing responsibility in relation to climate change.
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A few dimensions are given special consideration in the chapters in this volume. One consists of so-called structural contributions. For example, Lang observes that while at one level one can think of corporations as subjects of liability for global harms, such as climate change, 'at a deeper level, it is the legal and political order that creates corporations that should also be responsible for the harms they commit. In other words, if states create corporations without regulatory frameworks or limits on their profit making, then the state should be considered somehow responsible'. 108 In a number of chapters, a separate role is played by historical contributions. Salomon suggests that contemporary obligations could 'be assigned on the basis of historical responsibility for past exploitation'. 109 Likewise, Shue notes that an important factor is a state's percentage of the cumulative carbon emissions to this point. 110 Kutz makes a similar claim, grounding discussions on responsibility on past conduct and history. 111 For him, it is irrelevant whether this past conduct was, at the time, blameworthy or faultless. He considers that '[i]nsofar as this history [whether in relation to slavery or GHG emissions] is ours, so are the traces of responsibility. To be a citizen of a state is to come in a family lineage . . . to be bearer of responsibility for that lineage. We must face the future in the shadow of the collective past.' 112 In other words, he rejects the idea of 'bygones are bygones' as a natural conclusion for past conduct that might have contributed to harm.
This approach has a strong socio-historical grounding in the sense that, as in other examples given previously, it allows for a better understanding of the structural conditions for the occurrence of harm. However, a number of difficulties remain. From a philosophical perspective, it does not really account for the retroactive attribution of moral culpability. Moreover, the relationship between this claim to a historical moral lineage and its implementation in a legal framework could possibly be problematic, in light of the current principles of international responsibility (such as the existence of an international obligation). More generally, it raises the question of the functions of law, and its possible limits as an adequate social tool in addressing past wrongs. 
The role of power
A fourth consideration is the role of power. Eagleton famously claimed that 'power breeds responsibility'. 114 The phrase is frequently quoted with apparent approval in international legal scholarship. 115 The notion is also framed in other terms but with the same underlying idea, for instance in the argument that responsibility originates in control. 116 There is also a strand of literature that transforms the idea into a normative proposition, for instance to the effect that responsibility should reflect power (or capacity, which is a distinct, but related, concept). 117 Assigning responsibility to states or other actors on the basis of power makes sense. Power refers to the ability of a state to influence or control other actors, and thereby get another actor to do what it wants, if necessary even against its will.
118 In this sense power is essentially a relational phenomenon. 119 In the context of responsibility, a state can exercise power in relation to another entity by making it engage in a particular wrongful act. If so, it can be said that it then should be this state that should bear responsibility for the harm, rather than (only) the author of an act. Tracing responsibility to the actor that wields power is also justified on the basis of remedial considerations. If harm is to be prevented, those wielding the power in relation to harmful conduct should be addressed, rather than those that execute commands. Only the former actors can terminate the wrong or ensure that it is not repeated. 120 The proposition that power breeds responsibility is particularly relevant in situations of shared responsibility. It suggests that power should be a relevant, perhaps even decisive, consideration in allocating responsibility in situations where multiple actors contribute to harm. Conversely, it could be said that if an actor is dominated by another actor, to the extent that its individual space for decision-making or its capacity to act is limited, the basis for assigning responsibility to that actor falls away. 121 The role of power seems particularly relevant for questions of distribution in two respects. On the one hand, power underlies the very structure of the rules on responsibility that are used to distribute responsibility. Lang argues that 'power relations . . . exist between individuals that allow some to blame others and, in so doing, reinforce or create anew those roles. Individual persons become blameworthy or praiseworthy because of the roles we create for them'.
Several authors in the present volume explore the role of power, or capacity, as a specific ground for distribution of responsibilities. For instance, Salomon observes that '[o]bligations of international cooperation could be determined on the basis of the relative power it wields in international affairs manifested as influence over the direction of international trade, investment, taxation, finance, environmental policy, and development cooperation.' 123 The concept of power has a number of more specific connotations and manifestations that can serve as grounds for distribution of responsibility. One of these is power as control. Dannenbaum observes that '[e]nterprise wrongs ought to be attributed to the participant states or organisations that hold the levers of control most relevant to preventing the type of wrongdoing in question.' 124 Another manifestation is capacity. This is particularly relevant from a consequentialist perspective, when the question becomes who is best placed to remedy a particular harmful situation. In this context, Miller calls this 'assigning remedial responsibility according to capacity': 'if we want bad situations put right, we should give the responsibility to those who are best placed to do the remedying'. 125 'Capacity offers both a specific and a general requirement: specific in that it is one of the bases that points to the requisite international duty-bearers, and general in that it is a prerequisite to discharging any obligation.' 126 As to the former, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has emphasised that particular obligations of international assistance and cooperation are incumbent on those states in 'a position to assist', and thus would indicate that capacity is a basis for assigning obligations. 127 To what extent capacity serves as a ground in positive international law is controversial. In the Bosnian Genocide case, the ICJ referred to This introduction of fairness can play a role on several levels, both ex ante in relation to primary rules and ex post in relation to secondary rules. Indeed, fairness can underlie the creation of particular obligations, as well as justify the particular distribution of responsibility should harm occur.
However, it would seem that claims to 'fairness' as a criterion for distribution have two different types of limitations. On one level, it can be considered that fairness as a concept is an empty shell that will be filled according to the normative preferences of the policy-makers. In this sense, it might not be a criterion for distribution strictu sensu and the conclusion of a normative discussion on responsibility, but rather the starting point of the discussion and the underlying reasons why a particular approach is adopted. Put simply, while they might not always use the term explicitly, it is likely that the authors who rely on any of the previously discussed criteria for distribution think it is fair to do so.
On another level, if there is an ambition to identify a substantial notion of fairness as an actual ground for distribution in a particular case, another problem arises: the possible absence of a shared sense of fairness that might be universally applied. As noted by Kutz in this volume, 'the logic of responsibility presupposes a context of exchange, both social and economic. Doubtless we can have duties of beneficence towards those about whom all we know is that they suffer, but responsibility is a subset of justice, and justice requires relationships. A truly global conception of responsibility requires a global conception of justice'. 
Transition to positive law
Even though this volume discusses the various normative bases mostly from an extra-legal perspective, they are fundamental in understanding and legitimising the future content, development, and application of the international law of responsibility. It can be recalled that while the law of international responsibility as construed by the ILC is generally highly flexible, in many respects it provides little guidance for solving problems of shared responsibility. 133 In that respect, the grounds of distribution articulated in this volume are relevant for providing further guidance for normative development. 132 Kutz, ibid., at 350-351. 133 Nollkaemper and Jacobs, 'Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Conceptual Framework', n. 7, at 363.
introduction: mapping the normative framework
In connecting the extra-legal perspectives to the construction and development of international law pertaining to distribution, two questions can be distinguished: when such connections should be made, and by whom.
The moment of distribution
A key question for connecting the contributions to the volume to international law concerns the moment at which legal decisions on distribution of responsibility are made. A threefold distinction is helpful in this context. 134 First, choices for a particular distribution can be made ex ante, by incorporating a particular distribution in the contents of rights and obligations or, as they are commonly called in international law, 'primary rules'. While discussions on responsibility often focus on ex post facto rules, as Kornhauser observes, such arrangements are only one means of achieving the aims of compensation and deterrence: 'Ex ante regulation through licensing, taxing of inputs, command and control regulations, product standards, and markets in tradable permits, to name a few, are ex ante tools that regulate or deter actions that impose risks'. 135 This holds for international law no less than for domestic law.
Indeed, it would seem that particular approaches to distribution can often more easily connect to primary rules, rather than to principles of responsibility. For instance, while the models developed by Kontorovich operate largely within existing law relating to piracy, they also allow him to critique existing law and offer suggestions for reform. 136 Second, choices can be included in rules on responsibility which are laid down before harm occurs. These are still ex ante rules, since they are laid down beforehand, even though they deal with allocation of responsibility once it has occurred. In essence, this is what the ARSIWA and the ARIO accomplish.
In this sense, the articulation of principles of distribution can underlie and induce development of the law of responsibility as developed by the
